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Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Motivation and Background 
Failures of structures and mechanical parts happen periodically, due to fatigue, 
wear, corrosion or other failure mechanisms. If the failures of critical systems are not 
managed properly, it can cause the loss of financial resources, time or even lives. 
Unexpected failures can lead to bankruptcy and lawsuits (in business) or unacceptable 
levels of unavailability of weapon systems (in military) during a critical moment of need.  
 
Figure 1: Consequences of a failure incident on operation costs /profit [1]. 
Figure 1 above demonstrates the potential cost of failures on an organization. The 
shaded areas in the graphic show that when a failure happens un-expectantly, the cost to 
the business is the loss of future profits, plus immediately wasted fixed costs variable 
costs, and the added variable costs needed to get the operation back into production [1]. 
However, an approach that is too conservative and retires assets too early can also be 
detrimental to operations. While a approach of a lower damage threshold of the safe life 
reduces the likelihood of catastrophic failure, the high safety factors tend to lead to 




Typically, in naval aviation the primary structure (bulkheads, spars, ribs, etc.) are 
metallic. If these structures fail in flight, this can cause the air vehicle to crash. According 
to a naval report provided to CNN by the Naval Safety Center, from October 2014- April 
2016, the Navy has reported accidents that total over $1 billion in damages [51]. These 
could have been primarily attributed to three major failure modes of metallic failure: 
ductile, brittle & fatigue fractures [3]. Other failure mechanisms common to naval 
structures are wearing, fretting and corrosion. According to a study performed by the 
U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in 2002: the total annual estimated direct 
cost of corrosion in the U.S. is $276 billion (3.1% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [4]. In 
2013 the costs of corrosion, has grown to $500 billion [49] and is expected to increase in 
the future. Structures can fracture and fail by the growth of manufacturing flaws (defects) 
or in service damage. The damage will grow if the following loading stress and shape 
factor conditions are met: 





𝜎𝜎 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
𝛽𝛽 = 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹ℎ 
𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
Crack propagation leads to failures, which cost money, time and availability of 
assets. However, cracks and other flaws can be detected before they propagate till failure. 
One way to detect damage before the advent of failure is thru the implementation of NDT 
(nondestructive testing). NDT is used to search for damage in structural materials and 




safe or fit for its intended use [5]. The scope of NDT applications can range from 
detection of safety critical flaws, to preventive maintenance processes aimed at 
minimizing expensive maintenance [5].  
Traditional NDT techniques include (but are not limited to) visual, eddy current, 
magnetic particle, penetrant, ultrasonic and radiography methods. Generally smaller 
damage is more difficult to detect than larger damage. One of the key features that helps 
to determine appropriate applications of an NDT method is the minimum damage size 
(𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ), that can be reliably detected by the method [5]. NDT can be utilized as an 
appropriate failure mitigation technique if it can possess the following relationship of 
detectability of damage versus damage that is large enough to be structurally significant 
(critical damage size). 
Equation #2: Desired detectability of a IS (Inspection System) 
𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝑎𝑎 
Where: 
𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹  𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 
The 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  (minimum reliable detectable damage size) is commonly characterized as 
the probability of detection (POD) of a specific type of defect as a function of defect size 
[5]. Each method, technique, equipment and process has its own unique advantages, 
limitations and 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . However, the POD information obtained from a representative trial 
is strictly applicable only to the exact conditions and defect types for which the POD trial 
inspections were performed [5]. These POD studies yield empirical data which is used to 
determine the 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  of an IS (Inspection System). The IS is the equipment, personnel, 




inspection. POD studies are typically conducted in a controlled environment. However 
many IS are utilized in field conditions where NDT will be implemented in varied 
conditions (such as physical space, access, viewability, environmental and other 
inspection limitations). These circumstances can influence IS capability and their varied 
affect is not typically accounted for in POD studies. It has been recognized that NDT 
techniques and instruments that have proven themselves in the laboratory do not always 
perform as well under field conditions [52]. As such, conventional POD studies may not 
be the best representation of in-field IS capabilities. Without an in-field study, this can 
lead to an overestimation of field 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , leading to possible overconfidence in IS 
capabilities.   
The IS in the field can be viewed as a collection of 4 smaller elements and each 
element interfaces with the human (in center box in black). A visual model of the 
relationship between these elements (and some but not all potential degradation factors) 








Figure 2: SHEL model [7] 
S: Software- This includes the procedures, manuals, standards, etc. Degradation 
from misinterpretation of poorly written procedures, lack of training, poor 








H: Hardware- Tools/ equipment, physical structure of part, etc. Degradation from: 
unavailability of needed tools/ equipment, inadequate resources for required task [7]. 
E: Environment- Physical and work environments. Degradation from: Work area 
hazards and issues [7]. 
L: Live ware- The inspector and personnel in the work environment. Degradation 
from: Shortages of manpower, training, retention, lack of supervision, support. human 
physiology, psychology, workplace design, environmental conditions, human machine 
interface, anthropometrics [7]. 
The personnel interact with all elements of the IS and as such parameters that effect 
human performance also have an impact on other elements of the IS. There are some 
common maintenance personnel errors, which can be applied to analysis of NDI. These 
common maintenance errors are: Lack of communication, complacency, lack of 
knowledge, distraction, lack of teamwork, fatigue, lack of resources, lack of 
assertiveness, and stress [53]. According to a study executed in 2011 [6] Table 1 below 
displays the breakdown of the causes of aviation fatalities. 
Table 1: Main causes of aircraft accidents [6] 
Principle Cause of Fatality Percentage of Deaths by Cause Category 
Human Error 67.57% 




Therefore, it is important to consider human factors in an assessment of IS 




is to quantity the effect of external variables on inspection capabilities. This will be done 
by performing an empirical (POD) study by evaluating input parameters that are factors 
present in most inspections. These variables are: The visibility of test surface, physical 
hindrances to the tester, comfort of inspection position, inspector backgrounds and size/ 
shape/ density of defects. Armed with information on how these variables affect IS 
capabilities and knowledge of the actual testing conditions in a field environment, an 
approximation can be made of the capabilities of the IS in that inspection space. This too 
can aid in the assessment of risk i.e. the potential for variation in cost, schedule or 
performance or its products [8]. 
1.2 Research Objectives and Methodology 
The objectives of this research are to execute the following tasks: 
1. Design and receive approval to test, monitor and record results on the 
capabilities of the IS. The POD will be executed by varying 
representative field inspection conditions, personnel, defect in test 
samples and inspection locations around the test bed (aircraft).  
2. Ignoring the potential effects of external variables on IS capability, 
model the POD of the IS with a conventional 2 parameter model. 
Determine the best fit of a mathematical distribution to the empirical 
data and which parameter values are the best for an analytical model.  
3. Assess the quantification capabilities of the IS by performing a linear 
regression analysis of the assessed size of damage vs. the actual size of 
the damage. 
4. To publish during a future effort an investigation into the relationships 




these relationships to form the basis of a multivariate model that shows 
the effect of these variables on IS capabilities.  
 1.3 Thesis Contributions 
The products of the research in this thesis are as follows: 
1. Development of a new NDT inspection protocol that can be used as a guide (or be 
resurrected) for similar research in the future. 
2. Collected NDT data thru empirical experiments that show the capabilities of 
common naval equipment in common operational environments. This data can be 
utilized to create an analytical damage detection model which displays the effect 
that common external variables have on inspection capabilities. 
3. Development and utilization of a Maximum Likelihood Estimation approach to 
properly analyze POD data.  
4. Generated data that describes the degree of relative comfort of common field 
inspection body positions.  
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis includes six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the 
motivation for the work, the methodology of investigation and the contributions of this 
work. The second chapter covers a review of applicable literature: Approaches to assess 
NDT capabilities, Assessments of HRA, an overview of NDT techniques and the theory 
of eddy current principles. Chapter 3 covers the process of fabrication and chosen design 
of testing specimens, the acquisition and use of a aircraft hull to use for testing, the test 
procedure and assessment process of the observed variables: Defect panels, inspection 
positions & hindrance, visibility (secondary access) of the test surface and inspector 




assumptions made and the post experimental methods: censoring data (binary and 
assessment), using distributions to model the binary POD data and performing regression 
analysis on assessment data. Chapter 5 summarizes the results from the tests/experiments, 
including POD, measured vs. actual size of damage assessments. Lastly, chapter 6 



































Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Assessment of Detection and Qualification Capabilities 
2.1.1. Approaches to Assess NDT IS Capabilities 
There are a variety of NDT methods and techniques and as such experts typically 
consider multiple options in determining an optimal testing solution. Applications of 
damage detection/assessment can be addressed in multiple ways. When planning to 
utilize NDT one should consider several factors: 
• The requirements regarding reliable and safe operation.  
• Quality assurance level that is desired to be achieved. 
• Physical- chemical properties of materials to be inspected.  
• Feasibility of NDT methods available.   
• Economic criteria (time, cost, ect.).  
In the selection of a suitable NDT method, experts should be involved to 
determine extent and frequency of required testing. [9]. In this consideration, they should 
assess all aspects of the IS (Inspection system), especially the qualification of the three 
constituent elements: Equipment, Personnel and Procedure [10]. 
 
There are multiple approaches to assess the capability of the elements of a IS all 
working together in concert: 
1. Review data/information on method/instrumentation capability. Ensure the data 
was generated using a similar IS and conditions, to the current application. There 
are several sources for generic NDI capability; however application of such 




2. Perform an assessment/ simulation under the expected inspection conditions, with 
representative samples that possess expected damage. Assess the detection 
capability to a pre-defined qualification target. Keep in mind: The number of 
parameters that could be tested is immense. Ensure the solutions parameters are a 
reasonable representation of reality [11]. 
3. Incorporate a full POD that generates empirical data. For guidance and guidelines 
on how to execute an effective POD, the Navy uses the MIL-HDBK-1823. To 
determine 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ,  thru an empirical study, the testing should include at least 60 
damaged sites [11]. To assess measurement error (or other qualitative 
measurements) at least 40 sites are recommended [11]. 
For this study, we will incorporate a full POD study to assess overall IS capability under 
varied conditions.  
2.1.2. POD to Assess IS Capability 
The reliability of NDT is commonly characterized in terms of the Probability of 
Detection (POD) of a specified type of defect as a function of damage size: 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 [5]. 
Qualitative assessment of the reliability of NDT is an essential part of aircraft structural 
integrity management. Current practices for determining POD require large scale trials of 
NDT procedures on representative components to gather data for statistical analysis 
which can be prohibitively expensive [5]. Keep in mind: 
• When POD is determined using a traditional POD then the conclusions from such 
information is only applicable to the exact conditions under which the POD trial 




• Broader application of the estimated POD to other inspection conditions is reliant 
on an engineering assessment to assume that the delta between test and field 
conditions will not reduce the POD. 
2.1.3. Probability of Detection Model 
As previously discussed there are multiple approaches to assessments of IS 
capabilities. An empirical approach to determine an 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  of an IS is not always feasible 
due to time, resources and other considerations/restrictions [5]. The tradeoff in planning 
and executing a POD study: Will the study focus on a specific environment and 
application to achieve greater accuracy & precision of a IS capabilities? Or will the 
assessment be focused on a broader, but more common inspection environment?  The 
goal of this thesis is to explore the more holistic view, a general assessment of the effect 
common variables have on IS capabilities. The variables assessed are: varied operators, 
defects present in structure and inspection locations. With this understanding we can 
discover how these common variables influence IS capabilities in field inspection 
conditions. 
2.2 Assessment of Human Factors on IS Capabilities 
2.2.1. Approaches Considered to Assess Human Effects on IS Capabilities 
As discussed in Section (1.1) human factors are a significant cause of failures and 
as such we will assess human effects on IS capabilities, however, this information will 
not be utilized in the analysis of detection capabilities in this thesis. To ensure our human 
tests are conducted in an ethical manner, the research protocol adhered to 3 basic 
principles contained in the Belmont Report: Respect for persons, benefice and justice 




approved a research protocol. The purpose of the board is to review, approve and monitor 
naval research involving humans. This oversight by the board is required to ensure 
human testing is conducted in an ethical & safe manner.  
Almost 80% of maintenance errors in aviation involve human factors [13] and as 
such it is important to observe the human effect on IS capabilities. HRA (human 
reliability analysis) is one area of study in PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) that has 
direct applications in many industries [14]. These studies are essential to understanding 
how the environment and inspection spaces affects personnel’s ability to execute tasks in 
the areas they work [13]. For the execution of this study 2 approaches were identified and 
evaluated to quantify Human Factors effect on IS capability. 
2.2.2 1st Approach to HRA: CAD & Avatar Modeling in SANTOS 
NAVAIR possess an organic capability to perform HRA assessments. One 
approach is to partner with the Human Systems 4.6.5.3. Aircraft Accommodation/ 
Anthropometry/ Design for Maintainer Branch. This group offered to provide an 
assessment of psychophysical, anthropometric and spatial restrictions and their effect on 
inspector performance. They identified that over 500 distinct measures of human 
performance can be used to evaluate the functionality of the brain, limbs, and other body 
functions [42]. However, the group offered to provide the following analysis: 
• Liberty Mutual psychophysical push and pull force limits- Evaluating 
lifting, lowering, pulling, pushing and carrying tasks on capability and 
limitations [41]. 





• Quantifying energy expenditure for conditions of static & dynamic 
fatigue.  
We determined the best approach to assess effect of inspection position on IS 
capabilities were to: 
1. Model the restrictions of each inspection space around the aircraft using 
FaroArm®. This is a tool that is a portable coordinate measuring machine, that 
can be used for 3D inspection, CAD comparison, dimensional analysis & more 
[43]. The device would create a dimensionally accurate scan of the physical space 
of each identified testing location. The technical data would be imported into a 
CAD format software, Verisurf® by utilizing reverse engineering with Verisurf 
Device Interface. Verisurf®’s model based definition lets users set a model for 
any surface or feature [44]. This would produce a 3D CAD solid model of each 
inspection space to aid in HRA of task loads on inspectors operating in test 
locations. 
2. Obtain some basic biometric measurements of each human tester. Information on 
how to obtain these biometric measurements are contained in appendix A, 
Standard Biometric Measurements. To ensure that each dimension is measured 
accurately and consistently from subject to subject, dimensions are defined in 
terms of body landmarks, which serve as the origin, termination or level of 
measurement of a dimension [15]. An example of these measurements is shown 
below in Figure 3. 
3. Standard Biometric measurements are shown below in Figure 3 & Appendix A: 
Acromial Height(3), Bideltoid Breadth(12), Buttock Depth(24), Chest 
Breadth(32), Chest Depth(36), Forearm Circumference Flexed(32), Forearm-




Fingertip Reach(83), Shoulder-Elbow Length(91), Stature(99), Waist Depth(115), 
Weight, Acromial Height Sitting(3), Biacromial Breadth(10)  , Buttock-Knee 
Length(26), Buttock-Popliteal Length(27), Gluteal Furrow Height(56), Knee 
Height(73), Sitting Height (93), Popliteal Height(86),  Thumbtip Reach(105) [15]. 
 
Figure 3: Standard biometric measurements [15] 
4. Input the biometric measurement data of each tester into SANTOS software, to 
create a digital human avatar. SANTOS is a mathematical model based on the 
Denavit-Hartenberg method [16]. This method is used to analyze links of robot 
kinematics, and each link has two parameters: the link length and the link twist, 




This is used for kinematic and dynamic analysis and is used to predict human 
posture, motion and other functions in a physics based digital environment [16].  
5. Generate a digital avatar (shown in Figure 4 below). Input the avatar into the 3D 
CAD solid model of the inspection space. Use the software to simulate each tester 
performing an inspection in each test location, to determine human performance 
measurements.  
 
Figure 4: Representative avatar in SANTOS [16] 
 This process would evaluate comfort (endurance) of a specific tester in a specific 
inspection location. To provide future assessments on testing conditions, new biometric 
and inspection space parameters could be uploaded into the software code. If data on the 
tester and inspection space can be obtained, an assessment of an inspection condition 
could be provided remotely. 
This method was not employed as it would increase the risk of testing. This would 




information. The storage of this personal information would require stringent data storage 
processes. To be successful this approach would require a close coordination with the 
Human Systems Aircraft Accommodation/ Anthropometry/ Design for Maintainer 
Branch. 
2.2.3. 2nd approach to HRA: Human Factors Assessment thru NASA TLX 
This secondary approach had the testers provide a self-assessment on the 
inspection conditions they encountered and how they affected their ability to perform the 
needed task, during the testing process. This self-assessment was a modified NASA TLX 
survey. The NASA TLX is a multi-dimensional rating procedure that provides an overall 
workload score based on a weighted average of ratings on six subscales [45]. This survey 
is utilized to quantify the effort/cost incurred by human operators to achieve a specific 
level of performance [18]. The Official NASA Task Load Index (TLX) is a subjective 
workload assessment tool to allow users to perform subjective workload assessments on 
operator(s) working with various human-machine interface systems [17]. The approach 
and how to execute NASA TLX is available in the Appendix D: sections A-D.  
This approach had several advantages: 
1. It is a well-established and proven method of assessment. Developed by NASA 
Ames Research Center’s (ARC) Sandra Hart in the 1980s, NASA TLX has 
become the gold standard for measuring subjective workload across a wide range 
of applications [17]. For example, it has been successfully used around the world 
to assess workload in various environments such as aircraft cockpits; command, 
control, and communication (C3) workstations; supervisory and process control as 




2. It provides a quick and easy method of establishing workload and is reliably 
sensitive to experimentally important manipulations [18]. 
3. NASA TLX reports user generated answers, and therefore provides insight into 
the user’s interpretation of workload/ performance limitations, using pairwise 
comparisons of subscales.  
The primary disadvantage of implementation of this method is the potential 
introduction of a response bias [18]. For this effort the utilization of NASA TLX was 
the chosen approach to aid in the determination if limitations can be correlated with a 
decrease in inspection performance. 
2.3 Selection of NDT Techniques to Utilize for Investigation 
2.3.1. NDT Techniques of Consideration 
NDT technology utilizes a diverse array of nondestructive processes to monitor/ 
measure direct material responses [46]. To select the proper method for any application, 
one should consider the following characteristics: The evaluation material, inspection 
environment, applied acceptance criteria, human factors and other considerations [46]. 
For our research purposes, the following selection criteria was used to select a test 
method and technique: 
1. Must be used in naval aviation. Equipment and expertise currently available in 
NAVAIR Materials Division laboratory. 
2. Easy to create appropriate test samples that represent naval aviation structures. 
3. Easy to implement, set up & break down of test and equipment.   
4. Subsurface detection capabilities, to allow detection to be solely from the 




5. Sensitivity and reliability would change and be measurable as external variables 
of test change (produced quantifiable results for these tests). 
6. Nonhazardous to testing personnel. 
The following NDT methods were assessed for use in this investigation. Below in Table 
2 is information on advantages/ disadvantages of each test method. 
Table 2: Advantages and disadvantages of considered NDT techniques [19]  
 
Method Advantage Disadvantage 
Visual Inexpensive, portable, 
minimum training and part 
preparation. 
Surface detection only, not as 
sensitive as other methods. 
Dye Penetrant Inexpensive, portable, 
minimum training, sensitive. 
Surface detection only, part 
preparation required. 
Magnetic Particle Potentially portable, 
inexpensive, sensitive, 
moderate skill required, 
subsurface detection 
capability. 
Part preparation required, 
semi directional, ferro 
magnetic martials only, 
demagnetization process after 
test. 
Eddy Current Portable, subsurface detection 
capability, immediate results, 
sensitive. 
Surface must be accessible to 
probe, only testable on 
electrically conductive 
materials. Skill and training 
required. 
Ultrasonic Portable, inexpensive, 
sensitive, immediate results, 
little part preparation, range 
of materials and thicknesses 
can be inspected, subsurface 
detection. 
Surface must be accessible to 
probe, sensitive to 
discontinuity orientation, 
Skill required, couplant 
required. 
Radiography Subsurface detection, 
minimum part preparation, 
permanent test record 
Safety hazard, very 
expensive, sensitive to flaw 
orientation, high degree of 
skill required. 
 
Eddy Current became the chosen method for this study. Sensitivity and reliability 
of the equipment are highly dependent on the inspector’s ability to keep probe normal to 
surface and as such physical hindrances can make it difficult to keep the probe of the 
instrument normal to the surface of test. The orientation of the probe with respect to the 
test object is critical [47]. Training, experience, and biometric considerations of testers 




 2.3.2. Eddy Current Principles 
Eddy Current testing is widely used in all types of industries to evaluate the 
quality of materials and components, including both ferritic and nonferritic metals [47]. 
In an Eddy Current probe, alternating current flows through a wire coil and generates an 
oscillating magnetic field (a- See Figure 5 below) [20]. If the probe and its magnetic field 
are brought close to a conductive material like a metal test piece, a circular flow of 
electrons known as an eddy current will begin to move through the metal like swirling 
water in a stream (b) [20]. The Eddy Current flowing through the metal will in turn 
generate its own magnetic field, which will interact with the coil and its field through 
mutual inductance (c) [20]. Changes in metal thickness or defects like near-surface 
cracking will interrupt or alter the amplitude and pattern of the Eddy Current and the 
resulting magnetic field [20]. This in turn affects the movement of electrons in the coil by 
varying the electrical impedance of the coil [20]. 
 
Figure 5: Eddy Current principles [20] 
 
Eddy current density is highest near the surface of test (which is called “skin 
effect”). Because of the “skin effect”, the depth of penetration of Eddy Currents is 
limited. However these Eddy Current’s penetrate the structure of test and therefore the 
method has subsurface detection capabilities. Eddy Current testing is limited to surface 




The permeability and conductivity of the test material as well as the frequency of 
the coil rotation, affect the current density of the eddy’s in the tests material [21]. As 
shown below in Figure 6, increasing frequency, conductivity or permeability, increases 
eddy current density on the surface but decreases depth of penetration into the part. 
 
Figure 6: Eddy Current depth of penetration [21] 
 
To understand the subsurface detection capabilities, the standard depth of 
penetration is defined as the depth at which the Eddy Current density is 37% of its 
surface value and is determined to be the maximum depth to reliably detect a defect [21]: 






𝛿𝛿 = 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑  𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 
𝜋𝜋 = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 (𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠) 




𝜎𝜎 = 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  (% 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆)  




amplitude and phase components [47]. Changes in the impedance amplitude and phase 
angle can be detected by a trained operator (or triggered by pre-determined gates/ 
thresholds) to identify changes in the test piece. An impedance plane plot that graphs coil 
resistance on the x-axis versus inductive reactance on the y-axis for use in pencil probe 
inspections as shown below in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Vector diagram showing the relationship between resistance, 
reactance and impedance [55]. 
As you can see the electrical resistance & inductive reactance (opposition that an 
electric component offers to alternating current) components in Figure 7 above, can be 
combined to produce a net impedance of the coil [55]. The amplitude of impedance may 
be determined from the known values of resistance and inductive reactance [55]. 
Inductive reactance can be calculated by: 
Equation 4: Impedance magnitude 
𝑍𝑍 = (𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿2 + 𝑅𝑅2)1/2 
Where: 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹  (𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 
𝑋𝑋𝐿𝐿 = 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 




It is common for the operator to choose a frequency at which the liftoff (distance 
probe is from test surface) lies on the horizontal axis of the display and the desired 
discontinuity signal displays vertically [47]. The larger the defect the greater the signal 
response that is created, due to the larger impedance of the eddy’s. Figure 8 below shows 












Figure 8: Eddy Current instrument responses of (1) .04”, (2) .02”, (3) .01” surface 
cracks. 
 
Keep not that variations in the conductivity of the test material, its magnetic 
permeability, the frequency of the AC pulses driving the coil, and coil geometry will all 
influence the test sensitivity, resolution, and penetration during Eddy Current inspections. 
2.4 Review Thoughts 
POD studies are used to quantify capabilities of IS, however in these studies the 
effect of external variables on detection capabilities is typically not quantified. This could 







variables effect of these on the reliability- capability of a IS can be understood in the 
following equation: 
Equation 5: Reliability of NDT IS [22] 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)−𝐿𝐿(𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃) −ℎ(𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹) 
Where: 
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 − 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹  𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 (𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  )𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 − 𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆. 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸 −𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆.  
The intrinsic capability (physics based) of the technique & instrumentation is 
typically well known [22]. Effect of application parameters such as access restrictions, 
test structure surface conditions and human factors on IS performance are the subject of 
the treatise. The application parameters that will be studied are positioning oneself for an 
inspection (primary access), viewability of test surface (secondary access) [55]. The 
effect of human factors that will be studied are the tester backgrounds: experience and 
education. Other variables include differences in inspection samples and external 
variables of testing (such as ambient temperature). For this study, the IS will consist of a 
trained operator utilizing a common Eddy Current system in a representative operation 
area. After recording observations and inspection results, correlations will be assessed in 
the data to determine their effect on the IS capabilities. This information will give 
maintainers, designers, and planners a more realistic idea of what size/types of flaws that 
can be reasonably found- detected in field inspection conditions with the IS. For 
conditions that yield low detection results, alternate solutions will be assessed to address 
monitoring issues (such as the use of SHM’s (Structural Health Monitoring Systems)) or 





Chapter 3: Experimental Procedure  
This chapter covers all aspects of the testing and data collection of the effort. This 
chapter will cover in the following order, the design of test samples and final design, test 
bed assessment as well as testing locations to utilize for the study. General background 
information about the testers and pre-and post-test procedures to provide an overview of 
the method and type of data collection employed during testing. 
3.1 Preparation of Test Specimens 
3.1.1. Factors of Consideration in Determination of Sample Design 
Damage size is a target characteristic but there are other characteristics that 
influence probability of detection, such as orientation of damage, morphology, density, 
defect locations and test structure shape [23]. While these factors can influence POD, the 
single most influential factor, is the size of damage and as such this parameter is 
predominantly used and assessed in POD studies [23]. Size and other aspects of design 
were considered in the design of test specimens as described below: 
• Size of Test Panels- A large flat surface was used to ensure there would be no 
visual aids to judge progress on the inspection. Larger surface areas are more 
difficult to adhere to aircraft and take the inspector longer to test. However, the 
desired test length is > 30 minutes to ensure the inspector will not maintain 
sustained attention and will experience a vigilance decrement during the 
inspection. After the first 15 minutes of a scan looking for simple signals, the 
tester’s sustained attention will probably decrease by 50%, and their attention 
does not significantly deteriorate after 30 minutes [24]. Almost all NDI 
techniques have an element of visual inspection [25]. For these tests the inspector 




the structure and which areas have yet to be inspected. Performance for a visual 
inspection, measured by the probability of detecting a signal or imperfection in a 
given time is predictable (assuming a random search model) [25]. The probability 
of detection of a single imperfection in a time t is: 
Equation 6: POD of a single imperfection in time  





𝑃𝑃1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 (Sec) 
𝐹𝐹̅ = 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 (Sec) 
To create an estimate of the time required to inspect a surface: the mean search 
time for a visual inspection can be expressed as: 






𝐹𝐹0 = 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝜋𝜋𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 (Sec) 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑 (Sec) 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹   
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆[25] 
• Material Composition- Choose a material that is common in Naval structures, 
inducing artificial damage into material is relatively easy, lightweight for 




• Thickness- Panels must be thick enough to sustain machining of  damage, without 
creating additional damage or severely weakening the structure of the sample. 
However, if the samples are too thick, the weight may make it difficult to adhere 
panels to aircraft.  
• Depth of Damage- There is a balance that must be maintained. It is desired that 
fabricated defects do not create a protuberance that is visually detectable on the 
test surface. However, if the bottom of drilled holes is not close enough to the test 
surface, they will not be detected with eddy current inspection techniques.   
• Size/ Types of Defects- Utilized are a spectrum of sizes and defects that are barely 
detectable to ones that are easy to detect with eddy current inspection techniques.  
• Coatings to Apply to the Surface of the Panel- Should exhibit or represent 
coatings and paints applied to Naval aircraft structures. 
3.1.2. Determined Design of Testing Samples 
The following characteristics were incorporated into the final design of the 
panels: 
• Size of Test Panels- a 12” by 12” panel was deemed to be optimal, for portability, 
adherence to aircraft and desired inspection duration. 
• Material Composition- Aluminum 7075 was chosen to be the sample material of 
choice. This alloy is used in aerospace structures such as stringers, skins, 
bulkheads, rivets and extruded sections [13]. Aluminum is relatively light and 
inexpensive compared to steel and titanium. 
• Thickness- For this application, 1/8” inch thick panels were deemed optimal 
which allowed for safe machining of defects and provided enough material to 




this propagation were allowed (due to utilizing a thin panel), it could cause 
erroneous results in inspections. 
• Depth of Damage- By testing the eddy current response from scanning over holes 
of different depths, the optimal depth was determined to be approximately (.01”) 
deep (from the inspection surface). As shown in Figure 9 below, damage holes at 
this depth would be detectable by eddy current and would not create a 
protuberance on the test surface, revealing their location.  
 
Figure 9: Amplitude response (dB) as a function of damage depth from 
inspection surface (in). 
• Size/ Types of Defects- It was economical to create flat bottomed holes (using drill 
press) and slots (elongated linear defects, using a mandrel) at approximately .01” 
deep. There is one instance of a defect created on the test surface of a panel using 
a saw cut. This panel was utilized for blind inspections (positions where the 
inspector could not see the surface of the test panel). Sizes of defects ranged from 
.06” (1/16”) all the way to 5” in length. Defects larger than .25” were slots (and in 







either slots or holes. Figure 10 below shows the damage size distribution from all 
the test samples. 
  
Figure 10: Distribution of damage sizes (in) fabricated in the combined test 
panels. 
• Coatings to Apply to the Surface of the Panel- For coating aluminum and 
aluminum alloys, the Department of Defense follows guidance contained in: 
o MIL-PRF-85285E [26]: Coating- Polyurethane, Aircraft & Support 
Equipment. The topcoat on these panels was approximately 2.22 mills 
thick (average). 
o MIL-PRF-85582E [27]: Primer Coatings- Epoxy, Waterborne. The 
waterborne primer on these panels was approximately .83 mills thick 
(average). 



































Si ze of defects (in) 




o The paintings- coatings on these panels were pretreated first with 
chromate conversion coating then painted the next day with a conversion 
coating (following guidance of MIL-C-5541 Type 1, compositions 
containing hexavalent chromium). 
The test samples were ten 12” x 12” x 0.125” 7075 aluminum panels purchased from 
McMaster-Carr (Product #: 885K15). After receipt of these panels, technicians from the 
Machining Branch in AVMI (Air Vehicle Modification & Instrumentation) fabricated 
damage in each panel per guidance contained in Appendix F (Panel Design) which shows 
the damage layout (position & size) in each panel. After fabricating defects, the 
inspection surface was sprayed with a thin nonconductive coating by technicians from the 
Inorganic Coatings Lab. For the application of this coating they adhered to the guidance 
in MIL-DTL-5541F. The coatings were applied to the surface with a total thickness of 
approximately .003” thick. 
3.2 Assessment of Testing Locations 
3.2.1. Test Bed Utilized for Study 
As discussed earlier it is important that the tests were executed in a representative 
operational environment, to accurately determine IS capabilities in Naval field 
conditions. There were two different considerations of testing platforms to utilize for this 
effort, both located at Patuxent River Naval Air Station. 
• Option 1: The T-Rex helicopter test bed. These were 2 UH-1N Helicopters, 
owned by NACRA (Naval Aviation Center for Rotorcraft Advancement). The 
organization’s purpose is to demonstrate and develop technologies in a naval 
rotary wing environment.  These flying test assets are equipped with 




simulators for virtually any rotary wing type platform [29]. Figure 11 below is a 
picture of one of the test assets. 
 
Figure 11: NACRA test asset 
• Option #2: A retired MH-60, located behind building 2188. The airframe is used 
to test new sacrificial laminates that protect windscreens against erosion. The US 
Navy has contracted VTOL LLC to develop an improved version of the protective 
laminate that would be suitable for the marine environment. Improvements made 
to the V1 product during this effort include: an increased adhesive bond strength, 
extended UV life, easier installation and removal, improved moist/humid 
performance, and increased total light transmission [30]. The sacrificial laminate 
film is composed of a PET polymer and has no HAZMAT issues and therefore 
was not detrimental to the testers on the aircraft. Permission to use test bed was 
given by Paul Roser (who acquired the test bed) and 4.3.4 management. As a 
condition of the permission, it was required that testers did not climb on aircraft 
and that their feet never left the ground during the testing process. Figure 12 





Figure 12: MH-60 test bed.  
The MH-60 was chosen as the best testing option as it was structurally identical to 
actual aircraft flown in the Navy. Currently there are more than 500 MH-60’s in the Navy 
and they are utilized for anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, vertical 
replenishment & medical evacuation [50].  Additionally, there was no competition with 
flight test schedules and the location of the test bed was very close to normal work 
location. However, some testing locations inside the aircraft were disqualified for study 
to accommodate the risk requirements of management. 
3.2.2. Testing Locations Around Aircraft 
Discrete areas of test were chosen around the aircraft. The chosen positions had to 
represent a spectrum of possible inspection positions encountered for inspections of 
aircraft structures. The following were the variables assessed of the testing locations: 
• Physical Restrictions- From no restriction to severe restrictions that limit 
movement/ accessibility. 
• Visual- Secondary access (the ability to see the inspection surface). The degree of 
blocking of site of the test surface. Objects partially or totally blocking the tester’s 




the inspection surface (see Figure 13 below). If 𝜃𝜃 = 90 degrees, the inspection 
surface is perpendicular to the line of site of the inspector. As 𝜃𝜃 decreases, it 
becomes more difficult to view the inspection surface.  
 
 
Figure 13: Spatial viewing angle.  
 
• Anthropometric Accommodation:  
o The comfort of the assumed anatomical position of test. Positions that are 
relatively neutral (see Figure 14 below) to ones more complex and taxing.   
o Fatigue- From positions that are comfortable to others that invoke fatigue 
in test subject. 
 
Figure 14: Planes of the body. [31] 
 
Each inspection position chosen for tests is shown in Appendix E, Part A. For 
each position a corresponding OWAS (Ovako Working Posture Analysis System) value 




OWAS has been used in other domains to analyze the postures of workers. It is a simple 
observational method for analyzing and controlling poor postures at a worksite [32]. 
These observations are contained in the Appendix E, Part B.  
3.3 Assessment of Testers 
Information on the testers was gathered by observation and thru a survey completed 
by testers (Survey is contained in Appendix G, Part A). Some general information about 
the inspectors is contained below: 
1. Age: Ages ranged from mid-twenties to late fifties. Four of the testers were 
younger than the late thirties and 2 of the inspectors were older than their mid-
forties. 
2. Sex: Two were female the rest were male.  
3. Education Level: One tester possessed a master’s degree & another attended the 
Navy NDI School. The rest of the testers possessed bachelor degrees. All testers 
had some training on eddy current inspection techniques. Four of the testers has 
ASNT III certifications in ET testing. 
4. Attitude: Inspectors were volunteers and were asked a week ahead of time when 
they could devote 2 hours to support a test. 
5. Experience level: This varied- 2 testers had over 20 years of experience in NDT 
either in military or government service. The rest of the testers (4) had 10 years or 
less working for the government in NDT. 
6. Unique Techniques Implemented: For half of the blind inspections, a linear guide 
was used (see tester notes). This may have aided in the detection and assessment 




3.4 Testing/ Inspection Procedure 
3.4.1. Pre-Testing Procedures 
To prepare, set up and execute a test, the first step was to determine which test points 
to obtain, utilizing the test matrix shown in Table3. 
Table 3: Initial Test Matrix*  
 
*Top table shows the variables in the test panels, middle table shows the variables from testing 
locations, and the bottom table shows the variables from the tester 
 
The test philosophy was to create useful data points under various conditions and 
repeated tests under similar conditions. This information help generate a better 
understanding of the IS capabilities under varied field conditions. Testing was executed 
in the following fashion: The test designer had to assess if outdoor conditions would 
allow for safe testing, if personnel, equipment (IS) and test needs (tester, panel and 
location involved in test) were available and set up. The test designer asked the tester to 




equipment, inspect, report findings and to fill out NASA TLX Assessment. Testing was 
commenced only under the following conditions: 
• Within ambient temperatures of 40-100 F (4.5- 38 C). This limitation was 
incorporated to ensure safe testing conditions, but also to limit the effect of 
temperature conditions on human performance of these tasks. A study was 
performed to assess the effect of temperature on performance of tasks and they 
observed: a decrease in performance by 2% per degree C increase in temperature 
of the range 25-32 C (77 -90 F) and no effect on performance in temperatures 
ranging of 21-25 C (70-77 F). [33] 
• For safety testing would be halted if lightning was in the immediate vicinity or 
there was heavy precipitation. 
• All participants were: At least 18 years of age and were civilian government 
employees. It was desired that testers had a technical background in NDT & that 
they were: an employee and/or rotational assignee of NAVAIR 4.3.4.3 AND/OR 
a graduate of the Navy NDI School in Pensacola Florida AND/OR possessed a 
technical interest in participating in the project and received training in basic 
Eddy Current Principles and Inspection Techniques. 
• At any time, a tester could refuse to test or ask for changes to be implemented to 
the inspection (such as changing the location of testing). In the unlikely event of 
an incident requiring medical attention for a participant, the experimenter will 
cease all testing, call Emergency Services and inform the Internal Review Board 
(IRB) of the event. No further testing could take place until the IRB has approved 




A pre- test check was performed of the inspection area before a participant executed a 
test: 
1. Test panel was firmly secure to the surface of the aircraft. 
2. Testing area was safe and to assess, mitigate or note of any potential hazards. 
3. The tester monitor was an individual required to complete Collaborative 
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) and was listed in the protocol package. 
Their task was to ensure that test equipment is ready: a thermometer, watch, 
clipboard with a rating scale, Modified NASA TLX Survey and Defect 
Nomenclature Sheet were available and ready to use. 
3.4.2. Testing Procedures 
The following steps were followed in the order shown: 
1. Tester was shown the location of the panel on the aircraft. This allowed the tester 
to assess which probe was the most appropriate to use for the test. 
2. Tester was given the following equipment which consisted of: 
a. EC Instrument Nortec 2000D+ EMI. The instrument offers a frequency 
range of 50 Hz to 12 MHz for Eddy Current test applications. [34]. 
b. SPCK-429-1, Surface Probe Kit: PAB0030: 3 Pencil probes with ABS 
bridge (TRIAX LEMO). Shaft is 3” in length and made of stainless steel. 
Exhibits a frequency range of 50-500KHz. Probes were either straight, 45 
or 90 degree probes. All made by EC NDT.  
c. Eddy Current Standard: VMA. 01-0-07T (for 7075 Aluminum Alloy). 
d. Grease Pencil 
3. Tester was given the following paperwork: 




b. Defect Nomenclature Worksheet (Appendix C) 
c. NASA TLX (Appendix D, Parts A-C) which consist of the following 
worksheets: 
i.  Ratings of Descriptors of Inspection  
ii. Weightings of Descriptors 
iii. Inspection Descriptor Rating Scale Definitions 
4. Tester then calibrates the equipment in an outdoor area and as per the guidance in 
inspection procedure (Appendix B). 
5. Execution of test: Tester transports the calibrated equipment to the identified testing 
location and commences with the inspection of the test panel. Any damage that is 
detected, the locations is marked with a grease pencil. In route to the inspection 
location the test observer informs the tester of potential hazards that may be 
encountered while testing. During the test the test monitor takes a measurement of the 
temperature 20 minutes into test and assists the tester if there are questions or 
concerns. The test monitor indicates if there are any deviations from a normal test i.e. 
hindrances from wildlife, distractions from coworkers, test areas wet from previous 
rain all are to be recorded. 
6. Report Inspection Results: At the conclusion of each test, the panel is removed from 
the aircraft and the tester uses a ruler to measure the size and position of the 
discovered damage. This information as well as characterization of the flaws is put on 
the Defect Nomenclature Worksheet (located in Appendix C: Defect Nomenclature 
Worksheet). 
7. Lastly the tester fills out a post inspection NASA TLX questionnaire that helps to 




3.4.3. Post Test Procedures 
The participant’s assessment will be compared to the known status of the panel. This 
“Grade” will be used to determine the effectiveness of the inspection. 
1. The information in the filled-out Defect Nomenclature Worksheet is compared to 
actual defects in the test panel.  
2. There were a few circumstances where the test data was censored from further 
analysis if it met the following conditions: 
a. When the tester reported the position of the defect and that reported 
position covered the locations of more than one damage area in the test 
panel. Also in cases where it was unclear which defect was detected by the 
tester, the data of the defects was censored. 
b. Censoring of Measured vs True Size of Damage Areas- In cases where a 
single defect was reported as multiple defects, it was unclear how to assess 
the tester’s reported size of the defect, therefore the tester was given credit 
on discovering the defect, but the data on their assessment of sizing was 
censored. 
3. The following information could be obtained from the recorded data: 
a. Position:  
i. For a slot: the length and the position of each of the endpoints. 
ii. For a hole: the position of the center of the hole and the diameter. 
b. Amplitude response: The tester indicated the observed response of the 
instrument. 
c. Characterization: Indicated if tester thought the damage was circular or 




d. Detection: was the defect detected?  
























Chapter 4: Analytical Approach   
In this chapter, the following information will be covered: The assessment process 
an inspector utilizes to discover and interpret potential defects. Also the assumptions 
made during the creation of analytical models that were utilized to assess probability of 
detection. In the analysis three potential distributions were used to model the parameters 
of detection probability vs damage size. These analytical distributions are: the lognormal, 
logistic and log logistic. The approach adopted to assess actual vs measured defects and 
potential sources of measurement error. 
4.1 Assessment of the POD of IS  
4.1.1. Introduction to the Assessment Process 
When a tester is inspecting a structure and assessing the output of equipment (either 
continuously or discrete intervals) one of the results are obtained in Table 3: 
• True Positive: Flaw is found when a flaw is indeed present (Correct Reject) 
• False Positive: Flaw is found when no Flaw is Present (False Call) 
• False Negative: No Flaw found when a Flaw is Present (Miss) 
• True Negative: No Flaw found when no Flaw is Present (Correct Accept) 
Table 4: Conditional probability in damage detection [35] 
NDE Signal Flaw 
Response 
Flaw Present Flaw Not Present 
POS A True Positive (T.P.-flaw 
present and detected). NO 
ERROR 
False Positive (F.P.-flaw is 
detected, but not present). 
TYPE II ERROR 
NEG N False Negative (F.N.-flaw 
is present but not 
detected). TYPE I ERROR 
True Negative (T.N.-no 
flaw present and detected). 
NO ERROR 
 
After an inspection, the Probability of Detection (POD) of the IS may be 




Equation #8 Probability of Detection 
𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷 =
𝑇𝑇 .𝑃𝑃. = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆)
𝑇𝑇.𝑃𝑃. +𝐹𝐹 .𝑁𝑁. = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿
 
The POD will be calculated for each defect size that was tested. A distribution is 
assumed and the maximum likelihood is used to estimate the parameters of the model, 
based from the data generated by the tests and data observed.  
The likelihood L of P (detection) follows a Bernoulli model: 
 
Equation #9: The likelihood of P(detection): 
𝐿𝐿(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖:𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(1− 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)1−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹  (0 = 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 1 = ℎ𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹) 








𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑  
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 = 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 
4.1.2. Assumptions 
One of the most widely used methods of estimation is the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimate (MLE) [57]. This analysis utilizes MLE and the experimental data to determine 
the maximum likelihood parameters of the POD model. This approach is not only to 
determine the parameters but also which mathematical distribution will best fit the data. 3 





The model will be based on the following assumptions: 
1. The assumed minimum detectable flaw size is .005”. For the experiments the 
instruments were set up to allow for the optimal detection of a .02” flaw, 
which would create an 8-deviation signal on the machine. Damage of half that 
size for the same calibration would create half as high of a signal (.01” flaw 
would create a 4-deviation signal response). A 2-deviation response (.005”) 
would be barely discernable above noise in the signal.  This is an estimate of 
the lower threshold of detection capability but there are many factors that 
affect this value: size of the probe, frequency of rotating coil, material of 
inspection, surface finish and other characteristics. 
2. That there is no inspection ceiling, (as damage gets larger the probability of 
detection increases). However, the POD never reaches 100%).  
4.1.3. Lognormal Distribution 
The Lognormal probability distribution function is described as: 










With a scale parameter of µN & a shape parameter of 𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁  
The Lognormal Cumulative Distribution Function is: 




Where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. 





Equation #13 Lognormal MLE 









4.1.4. Logistic Distribution 
The Logistic probability distribution function is: 








With a scale parameter of s & location parameter of 𝜋𝜋. 
Logistic Cumulative Distribution Function is: 








4.1.5. Log Logistic Distribution 
The log-logistic probability distribution function is: 
Equation #16: Log logistic probability distribution function 
𝜋𝜋(𝐹𝐹) =
(𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼� )(𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼⁄ )𝛽𝛽−1
(1 + (𝑓𝑓 𝛼𝛼⁄ )𝛽𝛽)2
 
With a scale parameter of 𝛼𝛼 & a shape parameter of 𝛽𝛽. 
Log- logistic Cumulative Distribution Function of: 







The POD model is a simple, broadly applicable model for qualitative validation of 
statistical parameters [36]. According to source [11] the data used to create the POD 
model should exhibit the following characteristics: 
• Minimum number of data point for Hit/ Miss is N=60 
• A uniform distribution of target sizes 
• Target range should result in POD coverage from 3% to 97% 
• Possibility of a POD floor or ceiling should be kept in mind [37] 
 4.2 Measured vs. True Defect Sizes 
Not all the data obtained during these tests is Bi-modal. Testers were instructed to 
assess the size of the defects they discovered during the tests. The analysis of 
measurement error is based on evaluating the deviation of the measured defect size from 
the actual or true defect size. Systematic Error (bias) may indicate overestimation 
(positive bias) or underestimation (negative bias) [39]. The analysis of error is based on: 
Equation #18: Measurement error 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 = 𝑎𝑎∗ − 𝑎𝑎 
 𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 = 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 
𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 
A linear regression model was used to model the measurement error as shown in 
equation #19: 
Equation #19 Linear Regression Measurement Error: 
𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 + 𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀𝜀(0,𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎) 
𝑆𝑆 & 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 





In summary, the following analysis is provided: 
1. Assessments on the following POD analytical distribution models: Logarithm, 
Logistic and Log Logistic. An assessment will be made on the ML value of the 
parameters of each distribution. 
2. Assessment of measured vs the true size of defects. Discussion will include;  
a. True size of defects vs measured size.  
b. True size of defect vs percent error of measurement. 





Chapter 5:  Results  
This chapter covers the following: The analysis of the POD test data; and a 
comparison of different analytical distributions to model these relationships. Next the 
linear regression analysis of the relationship between measured vs actual damage sizes is 
covered. Discussed last will be the sources of potential errors in sizing of the IS. 
5.1. POD Analysis 
5.1.1. Assessment of POD  
Out of 25 executed tests, 124 data points (on POD) were collected. Five of these 
data points have been censored because the testers marked one defect over the position of 
many defects and as such it was unclear which damage areas were detected by the IS. For 
additional information on censoring refer to section 3.4.3. To support the POD analysis, 
119 data points were used that were obtained from the tests as shown in the data table 
below, Table 4. 
Table 5: POD results 
Size of Flaw (in) Hits (detections) Total Tested Averaged POD 
.03” 14 28 .5 
.06” 3 4 ,75 
.125” 11 12 .92 
.25” 9 10 .9 
.5” 1 1 1 
1” 2 2 1 
1.4” 11 11 1 
2.25” 4 4 1 
2.8” 15 15 1 
3” 15 15 1 
3.15” 6 6 1 
4” 5 5 1 
4.24” 5 5 1 
5” 1 1 1 
This table displays the total amount of POD data points for each size of tested 
defect. In the leftmost column is the size of the damage area is displayed. The next 




column display the number of tested damage areas of a particular size. The last column 
displays the averaged POD (column 2/ column 3). What is observed is an expected trend, 
as damage size increases; the damage has a higher likelihood to be detected. The one 
exception is the comparison between damage sizes of .125” to .25”. In both 
circumstances one flaw of a particular damage size was not detected, however the smaller 
flaws had a greater number of tests (and thus yielded a higher averaged POD). Figure 15  
shows the size and quantity of damage areas that were tested. 
 
Figure 15: The amount of damage sites tested per size of damage area 
5.1.2. Modeling of POD  
Using data obtained from testing (Table 4), assessments were made on the fit of 
mathematical distributions to the data to model the behavior/ relationship between 
damage size and the IS POD in the varying testing conditions. The Matlab code utilized 
for these models can be found in the appendix: J, parts A-C. Below are the analytical 
models, with confidence intervals, the MLE value of parameters and a brief discussion. 
The model results for damage size <.005” will be ignored as this is the deemed minimum 

































Size of Damage (in) 
Amount of Damage Sites Tested Per Size of Damage 
(in) 






Figure 16: Lognormal fit of the POD data 
 
ML mean parameter µN = -.31 
ML standard deviation parameter of σN= 3.1 
 
Figure 17: ML mean parameter (left) & ML standard deviation parameter (right) of 
a lognormal fit to the POD data 
Discussion of Lognormal Fit: There are no significant issues in modeling the behavior of 






Figure 18: Logistic fit of the POD data 
 
ML scale parameter of s =  .9 
ML location parameter of 𝜋𝜋.= 1.8 
 
 
Figure 19: ML scale parameter (Left) & ML location parameter (Right) of a logistic 
fit to the POD data. 
Discussion of Logistic Fit: As the flaw size approaches zero, the POD does not converge 
to zero. Instead it reaches an asymptote at approximately 10% POD. Assuming that 






Figure 20: Log logistic fit of the POD data 
 
ML scale parameter of 𝛼𝛼 = -.5 
& a shape parameter of 𝛽𝛽.= 1.03 
 
Figure 21: ML scale parameter (Left) & ML location parameter (Right) of a log 
logistic fit to the POD data 
Discussion of Log Logistic Fit: There are no significant concerns to the fit of this 




5.2.3. Assessment of Models  
To determine if the models do a good job of depicting IS behavior, compare their 
results to past data of similar IS. It is expected that for a conventional eddy current IS 
utilizing a pencil probe for free hand scanning of a flat open aluminum surface less than 
4” square that a crack of length .25” and depth of .125” has a 𝑎𝑎90/95  of being detected 
[40] (where 𝑎𝑎90/95  is equivalent to saying the IS can find (out of 10 flaws of that size 
with a 95% confidence). Our analytical models predict: 
Lognormal 𝑎𝑎90/95  = 10” (Estimated) 
Logistic 𝑎𝑎90/95= 3.85” 
Log Logistic 𝑎𝑎90/95=10” (Estimated) 
In comparison to past data and the current testing, the results of the created 
models show either: 
1. The IS utilized in testing has less capability (or testing conditions had an 
significant impact on test results). 
2. Error in the models or testing process 
3. Combination of the above 
Further Discussion: 
1. IS tested possesses less capability or experienced more difficult testing 
conditions: The Wright Patterson Study gives an idea on similar IS capabilities, 
let’s compare the results of the two. 
a. Similarities: the equipment, inspection techniques, general design of test 
samples (flat lightly coated aluminum panels including surface 
roughness), test procedures validated & verified by NDI Level 3 Engineer 




b. Differences:  
Table 6: Differences between Pax River testing conditions and Source 40 
dependency conditions 
 Pax River Tests Source 40 
Inspection area 100” Sq 4” Sq 
Visual Access Unhindered to 
completely blocked. 
Ability to monitor 
signal & ensure 
positive contact with 
surface. 






.01” deep from 
surface, mainly 
drilled from opposite 
surface. 
Unknown. 
The differences between testing conditions shown above in table 5 could account 
for the discrepancy between the expected results and the obtained results. 
2. Error in Models or Tests:  
a. Possible error in model development: Improper distributions to model 
relationship, errors in code or incorrect assumptions. 
b. Possible error in tests: Incorrect reading or recording of data. 
All models created from these tests indicate much more conservative detection 




Additionally, external conditions were varied and in most cases had a detrimental effect 
on IS capabilities and as such, it was expected this effort would produce a more 
conservative detection capability.  
5.3 Measured Defect Sizes vs. True Defect Sizes 
During the tests, there were a total of 102 detected damage areas. Of the 102 
detected damage areas, 89 of those provide valid data points to assess measured vs true 
damage size (see table 7 below). 13 defects were censored: In cases where a single defect 
was reported as multiple defects, it was unclear how to assess the testers reported size of the 
defect. Therefore, the test point yielded POD data that was not censored, but the data on their 
assessment of sizing was censored. 
The actual size of the tested damage ranged from .06” to 5” in length. The below 
table (Table 6) contains the information obtained during the testing on these defects. The 
very left column indicates the actual size of the defects while the other columns indicate 
the measured sizes of the defects. 




Measured Size (in) 
.03 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.125 0.125 0.2 0.125 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.125 0.125 
.06 0.5 .2 .125            
.125 0.2 .5 .25 .375 0.2 0.5 0.25 0.2 0.3 0.25 0.25    
.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 .25 0.4 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.5      
.5 .5              
1 1 1.1             
1.4 1.5 1.75 1.4 1.5 1 1 1.1 1.13 1 1     
2.25 0.3 0.5             
2.8 2.9 2.31 2.75 2.75 2.8 2.8 2.75 2.75 2.38 2.75 2.75 2.75 3 3 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3    
3.15 3.2 3.25             
4 4 4 4.1 4           
4.25 4.3 3.5 1 4.25 3.61          





Below is a linear regression model (where the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable is: Y= a* X + b). This linear regression model fits 
the data. This model is shown below in Figure 22. The data is marked in black dots, the X 
position indicates the actual size of the defect, and the Y position indicates the measured 
size according to the IS (both are in inches).  
 
Figure 22: True damage size (x-Axis in inches) Vs measured damage size (y-
Axis in inches) 
The blue line indicates a best fit line to the data. The equation for a linear 
regression relationship is (Equation 19):  
𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 + 𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀𝜀(0,𝜎𝜎𝑎𝑎) 
In this case the discovered parameters are: 
    95% Confidence Interval 
𝑆𝑆 = .8708   Lower Bound: .8043 Upper Bound: .9373  
𝐹𝐹 = .1566  Lower Bound: .0092 Upper Bound: .3039 
With a coefficient of determination of .8861, 88.6% of the total variation in the measured 
size of defects can be explained by the equation obtained on the linear relationship 




Here is a closer look at the ability of the IS ability to measure defect size:  
 
Figure 23: Percent difference between measured damage size (by IS) vs true damage 
size  
In Figure 23 above, the data shows the total percent difference between measured 
damage size (by IS) to true damage size in all the experiments. 
 
Figure 24: Measured vs. true defect sizes, for defects <1”. 
 
Figure 24 suggests the smallest damage areas were greatly oversized (in some 
cases almost 500% greater than their actual size). As damage size increases, the percent 
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Figure 25: Threshold of Oversizing vs Under Sizing of Damage Areas by IS.  
 
As seen in Figure 25 above, defects <1.25” tended to be oversized by the IS while 
defects >1.25” were undersized. 
5.4 Discussion of Errors 
The eddy current coil size is approximately 1/8” = .125”. Ideally an inspector 
could determine the length of a defect up to half the coil diameter of the probe. For our 
IS, the probe utilized had a diameter of 1/8”, therefore a defect could be sized to 1/16” 
=.0625”. This IS having an expected systematic error in sizing flaws of <.0625”.  
For larger defects, there is a systematic error present; however, this does not 
explain the total error of measurement detected. If we subtract the systematic error from 
the total error, we obtain an idea of the error from other sources. The difference (or 
random error) of each defect size is shown in the below in Table 7.  





5.5 Discussion of Test Implementation 
To providing a better understanding of the overall difficulty of implementing an 
inspection for each test, the data in Table 9 provides information on the conditions of 
tests.   
Table 9: Conditions of test 
 
 
This data in Table 9 shows the following information in each section. For rated variables, 
this is on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating low likelihood effect on IS performance, 5 
indicating a high likelihood on IS performance: 
• Section 1: test number (1, 2, etc.). 




• Section 3: rated variables of testing location (Accessibility, body positions, 
fatigue, viability & angle of panel). 
• Section 4: rated variables of inspector’s background (training and years of 
experience). 
• Section 5: median rating of each test (of all variables of Sections 2-4). 
• Section 6: actual testing conditions: The panel, location and tester used in each 
test. 
• Section 7: the number and difficulty of each variable that was tested for total tests. 
• Section 8: the total number of variables of test and their relative hindrance to a 
successful test.  
With limitations on the availability of inspectors, testing positions and test 
samples, randomization of variables was not possible. There were instances where the 
test plan for the week needed to change last minute (due to unavailability of 
inspectors, either conditions or other considerations)  
Median values are used to in Section 5 of table 9 to give an overall (but not 
necessarily accurate) picture of the difficulties encountered at each test. For example, 
a journeyman inspector inspecting a medium panel in a medium inspection area, may 
produce better results than a new inspector using an easy panel in an easy to test 













Chapter 6:  Recommendations & Conclusion for Future Work 
6.1 Summary 
Probability of detection studies were performed with a variety of samples, testers 
and inspection areas around a test bed to determine the effects of external conditions on 
IS capability. These tests were performed in an operationally representative environment 
and test data was recorded including: Detection, positional, characterization, sizing 
errors. Variables recorded are temperature, probe used, position in aircraft, time to 
execute test, NASA TLX results. The analysis in this effort is focused specifically on 
assessment of detection capabilities and sizing errors. 
 Detection capabilities of the IS were modeled with a POD. The model used MLE 
(maximum likelihood estimate) to assess the parameters of a Lognormal, Logistic and 
Log Logistic distributions. Results from this study show lower detection capabilities of 
this IS than previously estimated, according to source 40.  
Further analysis was conducted from the same data set to determine capability of 
the IS to quantify defects detected. A regression model was created to observe IS 
measurement trends. It was observed that flaws less than 1.25” tended to be oversized 
(reported larger than they actually are, and that flaws greater than 1.25” tended to be 
reported undersized. For the smallest defects a great part of the error can be contributed 
to the sizing limitations of the equipment. For larger flaws the errors are more random in 
nature. 
6.2. Summary of Quantitative Assessments 
 The following are contributed assessments from this work: 
1. A better understanding of this IS degree of random sizing error as a function of 




2. An investigation into the source of error in sizing small damage areas: The 
inspection equipment. Also, the degree of systematic error by the limitations of 
the equipment. 
3. The probability of detection under common varying field inspection conditions. 
4. A testing process to assess detection capability as a function of inspection 
conditions (tester, inspection area, visibility, temperature and other 
considerations).  
6.3. Future Work  
6.3.1. Utilize Database to Perform Single Parameter Transfer for 𝒂𝒂� 𝒗𝒗𝒗𝒗 𝒂𝒂 Data for 
Various Inspection Conditions. 
 As a result of this work there is now a database of Eddy Current inspection data 
obtained under various inspection conditions. If there is a desire to determine the POD 
with a similar IS under non-assessed inspection conditions one could use a transfer 
function to obtain new estimates of the inspection capability. If all variables with a 
capability estimate are known and the inspection data used to generate these estimates are 
available, it is possible to use existing data to apply a transfer function in order to provide 
a reasonable detection estimate [39]. In Figure 26 below, a transfer function is used for a 
IS that has been calibrated with a larger notch (lower sensitivity) than normally used for 
an inspection. One must have an understanding of all the factors used to develop the 
original data set as well as the factors that may influence the capability of the inspection 





-Figure 26: The use of a transfer function on POD data [39]. 
6.3.2. Assessment of TLX on IS capability  
To understand the relationship between TLX assessment and degradation of 
inspection performance, one can show this relationship with Qualitative Adjustment 
Factors (inspect ability factor). The inspect ability factor is assigned based on qualitative 
assessment of inspection difficulty and human factor challenges only [39]. For use a aNDI  
should be adjusted by multiplying it with the appropriate factor. These factors can be 
calculated with the data obtained by this study. Quantifying the relationship between 
TLX and their corresponding effect on IS capabilities would be of value and can used as 
an assessment tool to assess IS capabilities in field inspection conditions. 
6.3.2. Assessment of TLX on HRA  
Earlier (in section 2.2.2.) we covered 2 approaches to HRA assessment of an 
inspection space. Modeling each tester in SANTOS would yield more accurate results of 
the anatomical effect each inspection space has on a tester. This information can be 




capability degradation for future inspections that involve TLX responses after the 
inspection.  
6.3.3. Assessment of random error in sizing defects  
In this study, there were random errors in sizing larger defects. An investigation 
into the potential causes of this measurement error would be of value. Were physical 
variations, parallax, personal errors the most significant factors? How can these errors be 
mitigated in future inspection to ensure more promising IS results and capabilities?  
6.3.4. Improve POD model  
Enough data was generated to form a basis of an analytical model. Interesting 
observations from the model indicate that the 90% detection crack length is estimated to 
be above 3.8” for all 3 models. However, all damage areas larger than ¼” were all 
detected in this study. This could be an indication of a poor fit or that more data needs to 
be acquired and assessed by the model. A verification of the models can be obtained by 
inputting the data into modeling software (POD-Q2) to compare model outputs. 
6.3.5. Utilize model to assess reliability of inspection methods  
These models / analyses were created to aid in the development of an assessment 
tool, to determine the best approach structural health monitoring approach (automated, 
remote (SHM) or inspector) for a specific application. For future Eddy Current 












Appendix A- The Standard Biometric Measurements 
Explanation: These are some of the standard biometric measurements, designed 
and utilized by the Army to incorporated biometric data into designs as quickly as 
























Appendix B- Inspection Procedure 
Explanation: This is the inspection procedure that was given to tester before they 
executed the test. 
 
EDDY CURRENT NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING PROCEDURE 
MATERIALS ENGINEERING DIVISION, CODE 4343 
PATUXENT RIVER, MD 
 
 
Eddy Current Method: Surface 
Nomenclature: POD Aluminum Panel  
Material: 7075 Aluminum Alloy 
References: NAVAIR 01-1A-16, NAS410 





Instrument:   Nortec 2000D+ or equivalent 
Probe Kit   SPCK-429-1, Surface Probe Kit or equivalent 





Frequency:   200 kHz 
Angle:   96 
H-Gain:   70.0 dB 
V-Gain:   85.0 dB 
Probe Drive:   Mid 
 
FILTER 
LP Filter:   100 
HP Filter:   OFF 
Cont Null   OFF 
Auto Lift   OFF 
Balance   OFF 
 
DISPLAY 
Sweep   OFF 
V-Pos   20.0% 
H-Pos   80.0% 
SCREEN 
 Persist   ON: 1 s 
 Disp Erase   OFF 
 Sweep Erase   ON 
 Dot/Box   BOX 











Alarm Dwell 0.0 
Scan RPM 1500 
Sync Angle 0 
WATERFALL 
 Waterfall OFF 
 Sweep min 1 
 Sweep max 32 
 Waterfall angle 96 






1. Load DEFAULT settings. 
2. Adjust the phase and gain settings to reflect the above values. 
3. Position probe on the reference block. 
4. Null the probe. 
5. Adjust lift-off to go horizontal and left. Adjust angle if needed to produce a horizontal response for lift  
off. 
6. Cover the 0.020” notch with a piece of Teflon tape. Scan across the 0.020” notch (see Figure 1).   
Adjust Gain/V-Gain/H-Gain, persist and other settings as necessary to achieve a calibration  
response of approximately 8 divisions (similar to Figure 2) & to allow for a comfortable inspection. 
 
INSPECTION TO FIND/ QUANTIFY DEFECTS: 
1. Place probe on part. 
2. Re-Null if necessary and confirm lift-off direction.  Note:  If lift-off direction has changed by more  
than 5 degrees or dot is not on the screen when the probe is placed on the part, the reference  
standard may not be close enough in conductivity for this inspection. 
3. Scan around the test panel as shown in Figure 3. 
4. Note any areas where the signal deflects vertically more than ½ division and NOTE the maximum  
amplitude height. 
5. To quantify Characteristics: 
a. Is defect a slot or a flat-bottomed hole? 
i. Scan along defect. If width = length then defect is a FBH. Otherwise the defect is a slot. 
b. Position: Scan along defect, determining where on surface maximum signal response  
decreases by approximately ½ signal height (6 dB’s). Find and mark these points on the  
surface with a grease pencil. At the conclusion of the inspection, note the found defects 
 information (position, type, signal response, ect.) on the inspection sheet. 
i. FBH, report position of the center of the FBH. 
ii. Slot: Mark ends of slot. Record these positions as well as length of slot.  
c. Response: Record maximum amplitude of defect found. 
6. Document information: Defect type, position, response in Figure 4: Table 1.  
7. Ensure the instrument is still calibrated properly approximately every 15 minutes by scanning  
standard and observing responses. If necessary Re-Null the probe on the reference block.  
 
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: 
Accept/Reject Criteria:   No defects allowed 
Inspection Location:   Surface area 10”X10”  
Method of Marking/Documentation: Grease Pencil on surface of panel. Mark/ record defect  







Figure 1.  Scanning across .020” Teflon coated notch. 
 
 

























Figure 3.  Scan area of panel. 
 































































Figure 5.  Signal Response of .25, .125, .062, .032 FBH’s. 
 
 
Figure 6: 6 deviation response for a .25” FBH, 2: 4 deviation response for a .125” FBH, 3: 3 
deviation response for a .062” FBH, 4: 1.5 deviation response for a .032” FBH, 5: ½ deviation: 















Appendix C- Defect Nomenclature Worksheet 













Appendix D- NASA TLX  
Part A: Description of how to implement NASA TLX tool.  
 
Description: After the filled out a defect nomenclature worksheet, the tester filled out a 
TLX worksheet for workload evaluation. On this worksheet, the tester quantified their 
expected performance and testing experience. It was executed in this fashion: 
1. The tester read the descriptors of the scales (see part b) to get and understanding 
of their meanings.  
2. The tester then assessed the effect of 6 distinct factors on their effect on their 
ability to execute an effective inspection, rated on a scale from 0 to 100 (refer to 
part c).  
3. The tester then was presented with several pairwise rating scales and asked to 
choose with of the factors most restricted their ability to execute a successful 
inspection (refer to part d). 
4. The TLX was then graded using the TLX calculator (part e).  
a. In row A, the results of step 2 were entered. 
b. In area B, the answers to the pairwise comparisons were placed. 
c. In row C, you  
d. In row D, the values are automatically calculated, each is the 
corresponding answer in A multiplied by answer in C. 
e. In cell E, the value is automatically calculated. 𝐸𝐸 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝜕𝜕  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜  𝑁𝑁
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝜕𝜕  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶
. The 
















































Appendix E- Inspection Positions Around Test Bed 
Explanation: Below are the inspection locations around the test frame. 
 






































Part B: Positions and correlated OWAS Values  
 
OWAS (Ovako Working Posture Analysis System) was created in the 
1970’s to evaluate current or future positional domains on humane workers [32]. 
It has been used to determine if postural demands are acceptable, establishes 
baseline to evaluate effectiveness of interventions, and the concepts of this system 
have been incorporated into other posture analysis systems. Simple observations 
are made about the trunk, arm, lower body, head and neck to determine relative 
discomfort [32]. Below are the results of 1 relative assessment made on each 

















Appendix F- Panel Design  
Contained in this section of the appendix are drawings which indicate information 







































Appendix G- Tester Surveys  
 Part A; Tester Survey 
Each tester was instructed to fill out a survey that helped to assess their background 
experience and training in NDT. The following were the questions: 
Question #1 NAVAIR Experience 
Years at NAVAIR ANSWER 
0 3  
3 6  
6 10  
10 15  
15 30  
 
Question #2 NDT Experience 
Years of NDT Experience ANSWER 
0 3  
3 6  
6 10  
10 15  









Question #3 NDT Training 
Eddy Current Training Completed ANSWER 
EC Level I  
EC Level II  
NDI Tech School  
Basic ASNT III Certification  
EC ASNT III  
 
Question #4 Total EC Experience 
Total Hours of EC Testing Experience ANSWER 
0 25  
25 50  
50 100  
100 250  













Question #5 Present EC Experience 
EC Testing Experience Within Past 3 Years ANSWER 
0 20  
20 50  
50 100  
100 200  
200 500  
 
Part B: Tester Survey Results  
Explanation- Below are the results of each testers responses to the survey questions. 
 
Tester 3C 4V 1Z 4Z 2C 6N 
Rating 3 3 1 5 3  
Q1: Yrs at 
NAVAIR 
0-4 0-4 >15 0-4 4-8 6-10 
Q2: Yrs of 
NDT Exp 




ET III ET III ET III ET II NDI School ET III 
Q4: Total 
ET Exp Hrs 
100-500 100-500 1000-5000 0-50 500-1000 100-500 
Q5: EC EXP 
Past 5 Yrs 











Appendix H- Rating of Test Factors  
 
 
The above table displays the difficulty rating for each factor. The very left column 
identifies each test panel, inspection location and tester. The following columns display 
the rating for each factor: quantity and quality of each test panel. Hindrance, body 
position, fatigue, viability, angle of view of each testing location. Degree of training and 
years of experience for each tester. Each of these are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 
indicating a low chance of a negative inspection affect to 5 indicating a high chance of a 





















































Appendix K-Matlab Code for POD Models   
Explanation:  
The code for the Lognormal, Logistic and Log Logistic runs in the following manner: 
1. Loads the detection data which indicates the true size of the defect and binary 
information: if the defect was detected by the IS or not. 
2. Sequences 20,000 random samples of a probability distribution using Metropolis 
Hastings Maximum likelihood estimates. It has a lower threshold of .005” and 
makes an initial guess of each parameter. Each guess gets closer and closer to the 
estimate and the end result approximates the mean & confidence bounds of the 
POD parameters. 
3. It returns the Maximum Likelihoods Estimate for the parameters of the lognormal, 
logistic and log logistic distributions, using the empirical experimental data. It 
approximates the distribution and provides a confidence bound of 95% (from 

































































































Appendix L- Matlab Code for Regression Analysis of 
Measured vs Actual Defect sizes 
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